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Abstract
This paper considers the nominal and real determinacy of equilibria under an ex-
ogenously speciﬁe dp a t ho fi n t e r e s tr a t e si na ne c o n o m yi nw h i c ht a x a t i o ni se i t h e r
lump-sum or distortionary. Under lump-sum taxation, we conﬁrm the well-known
ﬁnding that equilibria display nominal (in)determinacy if the primary surplus is ex-
ogenous (endogenous). Under distortionary taxation, this classiﬁcation is no longer
relevant. Nominal determinacy is always ensured since distortionary taxes establish a
link between the allocation and the sequences of taxes and debt and, hence, the price
level, regardless of whether the primary surplus is exogenous or endogenous. Distor-
tionary taxation, however, increases the scope for real indeterminacy. As a general
feature, the real (in)determinacy of equilibria depends on the interaction of ﬁscal and
monetary policies, i.e. on the sequences of taxes, debt, and interest rates. If, for
example, ﬁscal policy runs a balanced budget the central bank should set the nom-
inal interest rate in a way consistent with long-run deﬂation in order to ensure real
determinacy. This ﬁnding is diﬀerent from a balanced-budget policy under lump-sum
taxes where no such qualiﬁcation with respect to the interest rate needs to be made.
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European Central Bank.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is well established that a policy of an interest rate peg or, more generally, of an exoge-
nously speciﬁed sequence of interest rates can be associated with an indeterminate price
level (Patinkin, 1965, Sargent and Wallace, 1975). This property has been reconsidered
in a number of studies with a particular focus on links between monetary and ﬁscal pol-
icy regimes (Leeper, 1991, Woodford, 1994, Sims, 1994, Kocherlakota and Phelan, 1999,
Benhabib et al., 2001, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000). Speciﬁcally, the ‘Fiscal Theory
of the Price Level’ (FTPL) has claimed that the equilibrium under exogenous interest
r a t e si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hau n i q u ep r i c el e v e li fﬁscal policy is speciﬁed as an exogenous
sequence of the primary surplus.1 By contrast, indeterminacy of the price level prevails if
the primary surplus reacts endogenously to the level of public debt such that government
solvency is guaranteed for any price level sequence. A particular example of such a solvent
ﬁscal policy regime is a balanced-budget policy, as discussed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2000).
A main assumption which underlies this classiﬁcation of the nominal (in)determinacy of
equilibria is that ﬁscal policy has access to lump-sum taxes. The primary contribution
of this paper is to show that this classiﬁcation breaks down if taxation is assumed to be
distortionary. Intuitively, with distortionary taxes the ‘logic’ of the price level determina-
tion is diﬀerent since such taxes establish a link between equilibrium allocations and the
paths of taxes and debt and, hence, the price level.2 This link is independent of whether
the sequence of primary surpluses is exogenous or endogenous, implying that, in general,
equilibria exhibit nominal determinacy under distortionary taxation. The determination
of the price level is thus a straightforward implication of ﬁscal policy non-neutrality and
does not rely on an equilibrium concept which has been applied to establish the FTPL
and which has been criticized by some authors to be inconsistent (see Buiter, 2002, or
Niepelt, 2004).
The paper also shows that, compared with lump-sum taxation, the non-neutrality of dis-
tortionary taxation increases the scope for the real indeterminacy of equilibria. This ﬁnding
relates to the result of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) that there might exist multiple
equilibrium allocations under distortionary taxation. In our set-up, since not only ﬁs-
cal policy but also monetary policy (due to transactions frictions) is non-neutral, the real
(in)determinacy of equilibria depends, in general, on the interaction of ﬁscal and monetary
policies, i.e. on the sequences of taxes, debt, and interest rates. As an illustration of this
principle, it is shown that if ﬁscal policy runs a balanced budget the central bank should
set the nominal interest rate in a way consistent with long-run deﬂation in order to ensure
that equilibria are locally determinate. This ﬁnding is diﬀerent from a balanced-budget
policy under lump-sum taxes where no such qualiﬁcation with respect to the interest rate
needs to be made.
1The term ‘surplus’ is used in a loose way as a short-cut for the primary budget balance, i.e. it includes
the possibility of deﬁcits.
2As pointed out by Bassetto and Kocherlakota (2004), this statement requires modiﬁcations if distor-
tionary taxes are functions of past incomes. In our model, however, taxes are restricted to be a function
of current income.
1The analysis is conducted in a standard cash-in-advance model with exogenous govern-
ment expenditures. At the outset, we allow for a distortionary income tax and a lump-sum
tax. First, to reproduce the well-known reference case, we set the distortionary tax equal
to zero and assume that all tax revenues are raised by lump-sum taxes. In line with the
above cited literature, equilibria display nominal indeterminacy if the primary surplus re-
sponds endogenously to ensure government solvency, like under a balanced-budget regime
(Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000). By contrast, equilibria display nominal determinacy
under an exogenous sequence of the primary surplus, as shown by the FTPL.T h e i n -
tuition for this ﬁnding is well understood. Variations in the initial price level lead to
revaluations of the outstanding stock of nominal government liabilities. In equilibrium,
where government solvency has to be satisﬁed, these revaluations have to be oﬀset by ap-
propriate adjustments of primary surpluses. Under lump-sum taxation these adjustments
do not aﬀect the equilibrium allocation. Hence, as long as the sequence of the primary
surplus itself is not exogenously speciﬁed, equilibria display nominal indeterminacy, i.e.
any particular equilibrium allocation is consistent with multiple price level sequences.
In the main, second part of our analysis we reconsider this classiﬁcation under the as-
sumption that all taxation is distortionary. As a consequence, there exists a link between
equilibrium allocations and the primary surplus. To see the implications of this link one
may, again, consider a variation in the initial price level which leads to a revaluation
of outstanding government liabilities. Under a solvent ﬁscal policy ‘oﬀsetting’ variations
in the sequence of primary surpluses can, again, be found which respect all equilibrium
conditions. Yet, in contrast to the reference case of lump-sum taxation, these variations
are now associated with diﬀerent equilibrium allocations. Put diﬀerently, any particular
equilibrium allocation is now associated with exactly one price level sequence. As long
as there are no other restrictions on ﬁscal policy beyond the constraint that government
solvency needs to hold for arbitrary sequences of the price level, there exists an inﬁnite
number of such variations consistent with equilibrium. This implies that, compared with
lump-sum taxation, the nominal determinacy of equilibria is ‘achieved’ at the expense of
real indeterminacy, unless further restrictions are considered.3
Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium can exhibit real determinacy if ﬁscal policy is not only con-
strained to be solvent, but is additionally characterized by a particular ﬁnancing pattern
that restricts the sequences of taxes and debt. As a speciﬁce x a m p l eo fs u c haﬁnanc-
ing restriction we follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2000) and consider a balanced-budget
regime. We show that in this case a sequence of nominal interest rates consistent with
long-run deﬂation leads to steady-state uniqueness and real determinacy. Intuitively, un-
der deﬂation the government tends to receive negative seigniorage revenues because of
falling prices and falling nominal balances. Under the balanced-budget regime these losses
need to be oﬀset by the issuance of additional debt, leading over time to potentially un-
stable debt dynamics. For this process to be consistent with an equilibrium, the interest
payments on debt, which are also potentially unstable, would need to be reﬁnanced en-
3To establish clear benchmarks, our economy has the feature that in the ﬁrst experiment (i.e. under
lump-sum taxation) real equilibrium determinacy is always ensured, irrespective of whether the sequence
of the primary surplus is exogenous or endogenous.
2tirely out of distortionary tax revenues. Such revenues, however, cannot grow without
bounds for feasible equilibrium allocations. Yet, there exists a unique initial price level
( a s s o c i a t e dw i t hu n i q u e l yd e ﬁned tax sequences and equilibrium allocations) that deval-
ues the initial nominal liabilities in a manner consistent with the real determinacy of the
equilibrium. By contrast, this mechanism does not work under a sequence of nominal
interest rates consistent with long-run inﬂation, i.e. such a sequence fails to establish the
real determinacy of the equilibrium.
Finally, as regards a regime of exogenous primary surpluses, we show for our benchmark
speciﬁcation that the shift from lump-sum to distortionary taxation may leave the real
determinacy of the equilibrium unaﬀected. However, we indicate that this result is not
generic, i.e. we show that also in this case distortionary taxes increase the scope for real
indeterminacy.
The question addressed in this paper is directly related to Leeper (1991), Woodford (1994),
Sims (1994), Benhabib et al. (2001) and, most importantly, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2000). As in these studies, it is assumed that prices are fully ﬂexible, but we relax
the common assumption of lump-sum taxes.4 Our ﬁndings correspond to Benassy (2000,
2005). These two papers depart from Ricardian equivalence not via taxation but instead
by means of an overlapping generations structure and establish that an interest rate peg is
consistent with nominal determinacy.5 Canzoneri and Diba (2005) establish the possibility
of nominal determinacy under an interest rate peg and endogenous primary surpluses if
public debt is non-neutral due to transactions services of government bonds. In a careful
overview paper, Leeper and Yun (2005) point out that the existence of asset revalua-
tion eﬀects induced by an exogenous primary surplus does not rely on the assumption of
lump-sum taxes. In addition to this aspect, we examine ﬁscal policy regimes with entirely
distortionary taxation and with an endogenous primary surplus. Benigno and Woodford
(2003) emphasize the importance of distortionary taxes from the perspective of optimal
Ramsey policies. Essentially, in their analysis it is the assumption of distortionary taxes
which creates a considerable joint decision problem of monetary and ﬁscal policy. This cor-
responds to our key ﬁnding that under distortionary taxes equilibrium allocations cannot
be established independently of the price level. Finally, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997)
show in a real business cycle model that real indeterminacy can occur under empirically
plausible labor income taxes.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a model with a transaction fric-
tion and distortionary taxes, implying that both monetary and ﬁscal policy aﬀect the
equilibrium allocation and prices in a non-trivial way. Section 3 establishes the nominal
(in)determinacy of equilibria under lump-sum and distortionary taxation. Similarly, Sec-
tion 4 establishes the real (in)determinacy of equilibria under lump-sum and distortionary
taxation. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains technical parts of the analysis.
4Corresponding to the assumption of ﬂexible prices, this paper does not consider interest rate feedback
rules (e.g. Taylor-rules), which are typically designed to stabilize inﬂation in a sticky-price framework. For
a comprehensive discussion, see Woodford (2003).
5Cushing (1999) stresses that within an overlapping generations structure departures from Ricardian
equivalence are not a suﬃcient condition to ensure nominal determinacy under an interest rate peg.
32 The model
In this section we present a simple representative agent model with ﬂexible prices. Money
demand is introduced via a liquidity constraint in the goods market. Government pur-
chases of the ﬁnal good are ﬁnanced by public debt, tax revenues, and seigniorage. Tax
revenues are raised in a lump-sum way or by a proportional tax on labor income which is
distortionary. Throughout the paper, small (large) letters denote real (nominal) variables.
2.1 Private sector
There exists a continuum of inﬁnitely lived and identical households of mass one. Their
utility increases in consumption ct and decreases in working time lt, the latter variable
being bounded by some ﬁnite value l such that lt ∈ (0,l). The objective of a representative














, with σ>1,ϑ ≥ 0,β ∈ (0,1),( 1 )
where β denotes the discount factor, σ represents the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption and ϑ denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply. Households enter a representative period t with two types of nominal assets, money
balances Mt−1 and interest bearing government debt Bt−1. The latter is issued in the form
of one-period riskless bonds, earning a net interest rate it−1 in period t.H o u s e h o l d sp a y
a proportional tax on labour income τd
twtlt (where τd
t and wt denote the distortionary
tax on labour income and the real wage, respectively) and a lump-sum tax τt.M o r e o v e r ,
households face a liquidity constraint in the goods market
Ptct ≤ Mt, (2)
where Pt denotes the aggregate price level. The cash constraint (2) implies that households
can in every period adjust their money holdings before they enter the goods market. Hence,
private consumption in period t is not related to the predetermined stock of money carried
over from the previous period, Mt−1. The budget constraint of households is given by





Ptwtlt − Ptτt. (3)
Let πt = Pt/Pt−1 and Rt−1 =1+it−1 denote the gross inﬂation rate and the nominal
gross interest rate, respectively. In the initial period t =0households are endowed with
nominal money balances M−1 > 0 and (not necessarily positive) holdings of nominal bonds
B−1 with R−1 > 1. Given these initial conditions, maximizing (1) subject to a no-Ponzi
game condition limt→∞ (bt + mt)
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ct ≤ mt. (6)
4where mt = Mt/Pt and bt = Bt/Pt.T h eﬁrst equation summarizes the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions associated with the labour supply and consumption decisions, the second equation
describes the intertemporal Euler equation, and the third equation gives ct = mt if Rt > 1.6






πi/Ri−1 =0 . (7)
has to be satisﬁed. There is a continuum of perfectly competitive ﬁrms of mass one.
Firms produce the consumption good with the linear technology yt = lt, i.e. labour is
the only production factor supplied by the households. Assuming a competitive labour
market, proﬁt maximization leads to zero proﬁts and wt =1 . Total output yt consists of
private sector consumption ct and government purchases of the consumption good gt, i.e.
yt = ct + gt.
2.2 Public sector
Monetary policy is speciﬁed in terms of the nominal interest rate Rt. Throughout the
paper we restrict our attention to the case where the central bank follows an exogenously
speciﬁed path of the interest rate Rt > 1 ∀t ≥ 0, implying that the cash-constraint is
always binding. The ﬁscal authority collects taxes, issues risk-free one-period bonds, and
purchases the amount gt of the consumption good. The consolidated budget constraint
of the public sector is given by Bt + Mt =( 1+it−1)Bt−1 + Mt−1 − Tt + Ptgt,w h e r e
Tt = Ptτt+Ptτd
twtlt summarizes total tax revenues. Government purchases gt are assumed
to be exogenously determined. In real terms the ﬂow budget constraint of the government
reads as
bt + mt + τt + τd
twtlt = gt + Rt−1bt−1π−1
t + mt−1π−1
t . (8)































in which S = R−1B−1 + M−1 denotes the initial government liabilities in nominal terms,
assumed to satisfy S>0. We consider three ﬁscal policy regimes.
The ﬁrst regime is characterized by the property that the sequence of tax receipts and,
hence, of primary surpluses responds endogenously to the level of outstanding government
liabilities such that the transversality condition (7) is satisﬁed for any paths of the price
level and of the interest rate. Fiscal policies of this type are called solvent.
i) {Tt (Mt−1,B t−1,g t,R t)}∞





πi/Ri−1 =0 (Solvent ﬁscal policies)
6We focus throughout the analysis on interior solutions consistent with lt ∈(0,l). As will become clear
below, this assumption will always be satisﬁed. The set of ﬁrst-order conditions is derived in Appendix A.
5The second regime uses a more speciﬁc description of ﬁscal policy. In particular, the ﬁscal
authority is assumed to run a balanced budget, i.e. in every period tax revenues are equal
to the sum of interest payments on outstanding debt and of government purchases of the
consumption good.
ii) Tt = it−1Bt−1 + Ptgt (Balanced Budget)
The third regime is characterized by the property that in every period tax revenues are
equal to government purchases of the consumption good. This implies that interest pay-
ments on outstanding debt must be ﬁnanced by issuance of government liabilities. In other
words, this regime exhibits an exogenous primary surplus, for convenience assumed to be
zero:
iii) Tt = Ptgt (Exogenous primary surplus)
In the equilibrium analysis below we will restrict our attention to two polar speciﬁcations
of tax policy. In particular, we will consider the cases where taxes are either entirely
lump-sum (Tt = Ptτt) or entirely distortionary (Tt = Ptτd
twtlt).
2.3 Equilibrium
We now deﬁne an equilibrium of the economy and discuss some of its main properties.
Deﬁnition 1 A perfect foresight equilibrium is a set of sequences {ct > 0,l t ∈ (0,l),
mt > 0,π t+1 > 0,τ d
t,τ t,b t}∞
t=0 a n dap r i c el e v e lP0 > 0 satisfying for all periods t ≥ 0
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bt+1 + mt+1 + τt+1 + τd
t+1(mt+1 + gt+1)=gt+1 + Rtbtπ−1
t+1 + mtπ−1
t+1, (12)
and b0 + m0 + τ0 + τd
0(m0 + g0)=g0 +( R−1B−1 + M−1)/P0,
ct = mt, (13)
lt = mt + gt, (14)
the transversality condition (7), a ﬁscal policy of type i), ii) or iii), taking as given a
sequence of government expenditures {gt > 0}∞
t=0, nominal interest rates {Rt > 1}∞
t=0,a n d
initial values M−1 > 0,R −1 > 1,B −1 and S = R−1B−1 + M−1 > 0.
While the ﬁscal policy regime i) does not add any additional equilibrium requirement
beyond the transversality constraint (7), this is diﬀerent under regimes ii) and iii).T h e
balanced-budget regime ii) requires
τt+1 + τd
t+1(mt+1 + gt+1)=( Rt − 1)btπ−1
t+1 + gt+1 (15)
and τ0+τd
0(m0+g0)=( R−1−1)B−1P−1
0 +g0. This implies that the ﬂow budget constraint
(12) turns into bt+1 + mt+1 =( bt + mt)π−1
t+1,a n db0 + m0 =( B−1 + M−1)/P0. Hence,
6under regime ii) the transversality condition (7) is always satisﬁed, since the sequence of
nominal interest rates is assumed to satisfy Rt > 1. According to the solvency criterion
the regime ii) is a particular example of a regime satisfying i).
The third regime of a zero primary surplus requires
τt + τd
t(mt + gt)=gt (16)
implying that the ﬂow budget constraint (12) turns into bt+1+mt+1 = Rtbtπ−1
t+1+mtπ−1
t+1,
and b0 + m0 =( R−1B−1 + M−1)/P0. Evidently, regime iii) does not ensure solvency, i.e.
under this regime the transversality condition remains a relevant equilibrium condition
after (16) has been imposed.
For future reference, we summarize some noteworthy features of perfect foresight equilibria
in this economy.
Corollary 1 For any equilibrium sequence {mt > 0}∞
t=0 the Euler equation (11) deter-
mines a unique equilibrium sequence {πt+1 > 0}∞
t=0, and (13)-(14) determine a unique set
of equilibrium sequences {ct > 0,l t > 0}∞
t=0. Under distortionary taxation, equation (10)
determines for any equilibrium sequence {mt > 0}∞




From now onwards the term ‘equilibrium sequence’ is meant to satisfy the sign restrictions
listed in Deﬁnition 1, unless explicitly mentioned. Corollary 1 highlights the central role
of the sequence {mt > 0}∞
t=0 for the characterization of equilibria in our economy. In par-
ticular, any particular equilibrium sequence {mt}∞
t=0 is associated with unique equilibrium
sequences for consumption and working time {ct,l t}∞
t=0, and the latter two sequences fully
determine social welfare. The following deﬁnitions of nominal and real (in)determinacy of
equilibria correspond to those in Benhabib et al. (2001).
Deﬁnition 2 The equilibrium exhibits nominal (in)determinacy if for any sequence of
equilibrium real allocations {mt,c t,l t}∞
t=0 there exists exactly one price level P0 > 0 (an
inﬁnite number of price levels P0 > 0) consistent with a perfect foresight equilibrium.
Since the sequence of inﬂation rates {πt+1}∞
t=0 (starting with π1 = P1/P0) is uniquely
determined for any given equilibrium allocation (see Corollary 1), the entire price level
sequence {Pt}∞
t=0 is also uniquely pinned down once the price level P0 is determined.
Deﬁnition 3 The equilibrium displays real (in)determinacy if there exists a unique se-
quence of equilibrium real allocations {mt,c t,l t}∞
t=0 (an inﬁnite number of real allocations
{mt,c t,l t}∞
t=0) consistent with a perfect foresight equilibrium.
3 Price level determination
In this section we examine the nominal (in)determinacy of equilibria for exogenously given
sequences of positive government expenditures {gt > 0}∞
t=0 and nominal interest rates
{Rt > 1}∞
t=0. We consider two alternative assumptions regarding tax policy. In the ﬁrst
7scenario, all taxes are assumed to be lump-sum, i.e. Tt = Ptτt and τd
t =0 .T h er e s u l t s
of this ﬁrst scenario are well-known from the literature (see e.g. Woodford, 1994, Sims,
1994, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000, Benhabib et al. 2001) and serve as convenient
benchmarks for the second scenario of distortionary taxation.
3.1 Lump-sum taxation
Assume that all taxes are lump-sum, i.e. Tt = Ptτt and τd
t =0 . The set of equilibrium
sequences {mt,π t+1,τ t,b t}∞
t=0 and the price level P0 have to satisfy (10)-(12), i.e.
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bt+1 + mt+1 + τt+1 = gt+1 + Rtbtπ−1
t+1 + mtπ−1
t+1, (19)
and b0 + m0 + τ0 = g0 +( R−1B−1 + M−1)/P0,
and
for regime ii) τt+1 =( Rt − 1)btπ−1
t+1 + gt+1, (20)
and τ0 =( R−1 − 1)B−1P−1
0 + g0


















+( τ0 − g0). (22)
Note that (22) needs to hold under all three ﬁscal regimes i),i i ),a n diii), since it follows
from (9) in combination with the transversality condition (7). Equation (22) says that the
real value of the outstanding nominal liabilities S of the public sector has to be equal to
the discounted streams of future primary surpluses and seigniorage revenues.
Solvent ﬁscal policies We start the analysis with regime i). Consider a sequence
{mt}∞
t=0 satisfying (17). According to Corollary 1 there exists a unique associated sequence
{πt+1}∞
t=0. Then, for arbitrary price levels P0 > 0 one ﬁnds sequences {τt,b t}∞
t=0 which
satisfy (19) and (22). Intuitively, variations in P0 > 0 lead within the left-hand side of
(22) to revaluations of outstanding government liabilities in real terms. These revaluations
can be oﬀset within the right-hand side of (22) by variations in the sequences {τt}∞
t=0 and,
hence, {bt}∞
t=0, and under lump-sum taxation these variations do not aﬀect the other
equilibrium conditions. This is the well-known nominal indeterminacy result under an
exogenously speciﬁed path of interest rates and solvent (or ‘Ricardian’) ﬁscal policies
under lump-sum taxation.
8Balanced Budget Evidently, the balanced-budget regime ii), which is a special case of
a solvent ﬁscal policy, also exhibits nominal indeterminacy. To see why consider again a
sequence {mt}∞
t=0 with a unique associated sequence {πt+1}∞
t=0. Then, using (20) in (19)
it is still possible to ﬁnd for arbitrary values of P0 > 0 sequences {τt,b t}∞
t=0 which satisfy
(19) and (22). Speciﬁcally, lump-sum taxes in period 0 satisfy τ0−g0 =( R−1−1)B−1P−1
0 .
Corollary 1 establishes a unique sequence {πt+1}∞
t=0, but the initial inﬂation rate π0 and,
hence, P0 is not pinned down. Because of this degree of freedom the right-hand side of (22)
is not uniquely determined in equilibrium. This exactly restates the nominal indeterminacy
result derived by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2000).
Note that in contrast to the ﬁrst ﬁscal regime for any P0 > 0 the sequences {τt,b t}∞
t=0 are
now uniquely determined. While consistent with nominal indeterminacy, the second ﬁscal
regime of balanced budgets is evidently more restrictive than regime i), a feature which
will become important under distortionary taxation below.
Exogenous primary surplus Under the third regime iii) the sequence of lump-sum
taxes is completely determined by (21), i.e. τt = gt. Consider again a sequence {mt}∞
t=0
with a unique associated sequence {πt+1}∞
t=0. Thus, the right-hand side of (22) is deter-
mined and positive, implying that the price level P0 > 0 is uniquely determined, which
in turn determines a unique sequence {bt}∞
t=0. This result restates the FTPL derived by
Woodford (1994) and Sims (1994). For convenience, the results of this subsection can be
summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose that all taxes are lump-sum such that Tt/Pt = τt.T h e n t h e
equilibrium exhibits
1. nominal indeterminacy under a ﬁscal policy regime satisfying i) or ii),
2. nominal determinacy under a ﬁscal policy regime satisfying iii).
The results of Proposition 1 conﬁrm the main principle established by Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2000), namely that under an exogenously speciﬁed path of interest rates and lump-
sum taxation the price level can only be uniquely determined if the primary surplus is
exogenously given. By contrast, the price level is indeterminate if the primary surplus is
endogenous or, more generally, if ﬁscal policy sets taxes such that government solvency is
guaranteed for any paths of the price level and of the interest rate.
3.2 Distortionary taxation
We now turn to the case where the government does not have access to lump-sum taxes
and all taxes are distortionary, i.e. Tt/Pt = τd
twtlt = τd
t(mt + gt) and τt =0 .T h es e to f
equilibrium sequences {mt,π t+1,τ d
t,b t}∞
t=0 and the price level P0 have to satisfy (10)-(12),
9i.e.
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bt+1 + mt+1 + τd
t+1(mt+1 + gt+1)=gt+1 + Rtbtπ−1
t+1 + mtπ−1
t+1, (25)
and b0 + m0 + τd
0(m0 + g0)=g0 +( R−1B−1 + M−1)/P0,
and
for regime ii) τd
t+1(mt+1 + gt+1)=( Rt − 1)btπ−1
t+1 + gt+1, (26)
and τd
0(m0 + g0)=( R−1 − 1)B−1P−1
0 + g0,
for regime iii) τd




















0 (m0 + g0) − g0, (28)
with (28), as discussed above, to be satisﬁed under all three regimes. According to equation
(23) the tax rate amounts to τd
t =1− 2Rt−1
Rt mσ
t (mt + gt)
ϑ. Using this expression in (28)


























0 (m0 + g0)
1+ϑ . (29)
Consider a sequence {mt > 0}∞
t=0 satisfying (23)-(25). According to Corollary 1, associated
with this sequence there exists a unique sequence {πt+1}∞
t=0. Hence, the right-hand side
of (29) is uniquely determined, implying a unique value P0. This logic is not related to the
speciﬁcs of the three regimes i), ii),a n diii), l e a d i n gt ot h er e s u l t :
Proposition 2 Suppose that all taxes are distortionary such that Tt/Pt = τd
twtlt. Then,
the equilibrium exhibits nominal determinacy under a ﬁscal policy regime satisfying i), ii),
or iii).
The logic sketched so far shows that under distortionary taxation any equilibrium alloca-
tion will always be associated with a unique price level P0. Yet, to establish the existence
of an equilibrium is more challenging than under lump-sum taxation since equation (23)
ensures that the ﬁscal variables τd
t and bt are not separable from the ﬁrst-order conditions
(23) and (24) which characterize the optimizing behavior of the private sector. Because of
this non-separability feature within the set of equilibrium conditions it is not in all cases
possible to follow a two-step procedure and to establish for a ‘given sequence’ {mt > 0}∞
t=0
the existence of the remaining equilibrium sequences as well as P0 > 0.T h e r e f o r e , w e
leave this issue for Section 4.2 below.
104 Determination of equilibrium allocations
This section addresses the question whether the sequences of equilibrium allocations
{mt,c t,l t}∞
t=0 are uniquely determined or not.
4.1 Lump-sum taxation
Under lump-sum taxation it can be immediately shown that equilibria always display real
determinacy, irrespective of the choice of the ﬁscal regime. This result follows directly
from the fact that tax rates do not appear in the ﬁrst-order conditions of the household
sector. Speciﬁcally, equilibria need to satisfy (see (17))
mσ




Equation (30) — together with Corollary 1 — implies that there exists a unique equilibrium
allocation {mt,c t,l t}∞
t=0.S p e c i ﬁcally, the right-hand side of (30) takes on a positive and
ﬁnite number ∀t ≥ 0. The left-hand side is continuous and increasing in mt, with LHS
(mt =0 )=0and limmt→∞LHS(mt) →∞ . Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium
sequence {mt > 0}∞
t=0.
Proposition 3 Suppose that all taxes are lump-sum such that Tt/Pt = τt. Then the equi-
librium displays real determinacy under a ﬁscal policy regime satisfying i), ii),o riii).
Combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 leads to the well-known conclusion that the
equilibrium deﬁn e di nD e ﬁnition 1 is not fully determined under lump-sum taxation and
an endogenous primary surplus, i.e. under regime i.) and ii.), since the price level P0 is
indeterminate.7 By contrast, under regime iii) the equilibrium is fully determined.
4.2 Distortionary taxation
When taxes are distortionary Tt/Pt = τd
twtlt, the real (in)determinacy analysis has to be
conducted separately for the three ﬁscal policy regimes.
Solvent ﬁscal policies Under regime i) the set of equilibrium sequences {mt,π t+1,
τd
t,b t}∞
t=0 and the price level P0 are characterized by conditions (23)-(25) and (29). One
easily shows that regime i) is characterized by real indeterminacy. To see why consider
some sequence {mt > 0}∞
t=0. According to Corollary 1, equations (23) and (24) determine
unique sequences {πt+1 > 0,τ d
t}∞
t=0. A c c o r d i n gt o( 2 9 ) ,t oo b t a i nap o s i t i v ep r i c el e v e l
P0 > 0 it is suﬃcient to have mt − 2Rt−1
Rt mσ
t (mt + gt)
1+ϑ > 0 ∀t ≥ 0. Within any period t
7This ﬁnding corresponds to the result in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), who show that a passive interest
rate policy (which includes a peg) fails to pin down the inﬂation rate in period 0 when the stock of money
held at the end of the period (Mt) provides transactions services.
11there exist for any given value gt inﬁnitely many values mt > 0 satisfying this inequality.8
Hence, there exists an inﬁnite number of equilibrium sequences {mt}∞
t=0, each of them
implying a diﬀerent unique price level P0 > 0, and, via the ﬂow budget constraint (25),
a l s oad i ﬀerent unique sequence {bt}∞
t=0. In sum this implies that the equilibrium displays
real indeterminacy.
Intuitively, the real indeterminacy of the equilibrium occurs for the same reason which
is responsible for the nominal indeterminacy of the equilibrium under lump-sum taxes.
Again, variations in the initial price level lead to revaluations of outstanding government
liabilities and ‘oﬀsetting’ variations in the primary surplus can be found which respect all
equilibrium conditions of the economy. Yet, under distortionary taxation these variations
are now associated with diﬀerent equilibrium allocations. Under a solvent ﬁscal policy,
which is silent on the detailed structure of debt and taxes, there exists an inﬁnite number
of such variations. In other words, when moving from lump-sum to distortionary taxation,
the ‘achievement’ of nominal determinacy comes at the expense of real indeterminacy of
equilibria.
Finally, we point out that for the special case where gt = g>0 ∀t ≥ 0 and Rt = R>1
∀t ≥ 0,r e g i m ei) is consistent with inﬁnitely many steady-state values m>0, each of
them associated with unique values π>0,τ d and b. Thus, there exists a continuum of
steady-state allocations.
Balanced Budget Under regime ii) the set of equilibrium sequences {mt,π t+1,τ d
t,
bt}∞
t=0 and the price level P0 need to satisfy (23)-(26), while (29) will always be satisﬁed.
After substituting out for the tax rate τd
t and the inﬂation rate πt, the four equations
(23)- (26) can be arranged as a system of two non-linear diﬀerence equations in mt and bt
∀t ≥ 0:
m1−σ
t+1 − (mt+1 + gt+1)













t+1 − (mt+1 + gt+1)


















0 − (m0 + g0)















Let at = mt/bt = Mt/Bt. Then, the system can be compactly rewritten as a two-














Rt (mt + gt)
1+ϑ . The RHS of this inequality is continuous




t > 0 and limmt→∞RHS(mt) →∞ . The LHS is
continuous and decreasing in mt, with limmt→0LHS(mt) →∞and limmt→∞LHS(mt)=0 , implying the
existence of inﬁnitely many values mt > 0 satisfying the inequality.
12Φ(mt+1)mσ−1





(Rt − 1) (32)
and Φ(m0)mσ−1






w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnition Φ(mt)=m1−σ
t − (mt + gt)
1+ϑ 2Rt−1
Rt . The system is
characterized by one backward-looking variable (a) with initial condition a−1 = M−1/B−1
and one forward-looking variable (m), as one infers from (31).9 Given a−1 = M−1/B−1,
one may be tempted to conclude that the system (31)-(32) has one degree of freedom
to determine inﬁnitely many sets of equilibrium sequences {mt,b t}∞
t=0.H o w e v e r , t h i s
reasoning does not recognize that working time needs to satisfy lt = mt+gt ∈ (0,l) ∀t ≥ 0,
placing an upper bound on sequences {mt}∞
t=0. Similarly, we maintain that consumption
ct = mt > 0 n e e d st oh o l di na l lp e r i o d s ,t h e r e b yr u l i n go u ts e q u e n c e so f{mt}∞
t=0 with
a limit value of c∞ = m∞ =0 . These bounds provide terminal conditions for (31)-(32)
which make the non-linear dynamics no longer tractable. However, as shown in Appendix
B, clear-cut characterizations can be obtained if one considers ﬁrst-order approximations
of the dynamics of (31) and (32) around steady states.




b =( g + m)1+ϑmσ2R − 1
R
, (33)
m + b =
1
Rβ
(m + b). (34)
According to (34) there exist two diﬀerent types of steady-state constellations which de-
pend on how the nominal interest rate R relates to the critical value 1/β. Equivalently,
since Rβ = π the constellations can be related to the level of the steady-state inﬂation
rate. In line with Deﬁnition 1 we consider only solutions satisfying m>0.








ensuring that there exists a unique steady state m>0.10 As derived in Appendix
B, local dynamics around this steady state, which we obtain from the linearized




> 0,λ 2 = −
(σ − 1)
(1 + ϑ) m
m+g(1 + R−1








0 (m0 + g0)
1+ϑ 2R0 − 1
R0




In this equation m0 depends on the realization of P0 which, in line with Section 3, is not a predetermined
variable.





R . The RHS is continuous and increasing
in m, with RHS (m =0 )=g
1+ϑ 2R−1
R > 0 and limm→∞RHS(m) →∞ . The LHS is continuous and
decreasing in m, with limm→0LHS(m) →∞and limm→∞LHS(m)=0 , implying the existence of a unique
value m>0.
13The classiﬁcation of the ﬁrst eigenvalue is straightforward. Assume R<1/β ⇔ π<
1, i.e. there is deﬂation. Then, λ1 > 1. Conversely, assume R>1/β ⇔ π>1,i . e .
the steady state displays inﬂation. Then, λ1 ∈ (0,1).T h ec l a s s i ﬁcation of the second
eigenvalue is also straightforward if one exploits that R−1
Rβ < 1 ⇔ R<1/(1−β) is a
suﬃcient condition for λ2 ∈ (0,−1). For convenience, assume β>1/2 and restrict
the analysis to R ∈ (1,1/(1 − β)).11 Then, if R ∈ (1,1/β) the steady state displays
deﬂation (π<1) and the equilibrium exhibits locally real determinacy. Conversely,
if R ∈ (1/β,1/(1−β)) the steady state displays inﬂation (π>1), and the equilibrium
exhibits locally real indeterminacy.
To obtain an intuition for these ﬁndings it is worth making two comments. First,
with π 6=1 , the sum of real government liabilities (m + b)m u s tb ez e r o ,i m p l y i n g
that at any steady state with m>0 the government is a net lender towards the
private sector (b<0). The uniqueness of such a steady state follows from the low
degree of substitution in consumption (σ>1), precluding the possibility of multiple
steady states characterized by diﬀerent debt levels.12 Second, to see why the local
(in)determinacy properties of the unique steady state are diﬀerent under inﬂation
and deﬂation it is instructive to look at the equation bt + mt =( bt−1 + mt−1)π−1
t
which must hold under the balanced-budget regime. If πt > 1 total government
liabilities have a stable root. This reﬂects that under inﬂation at any given level of
real balances the government receives positive seigniorage revenues because of rising
prices and, hence, of rising nominal balances. Under the balanced-budget require-
ment these revenues are used to reduce the outstanding amount of debt. These
‘benign’ dynamics converge locally to a unique steady state m = −b>0 for arbi-
trary initial conditions. By contrast, if πt < 1 total government liabilities have an
unstable root and, at a given level of real balances, the government receives negative
seigniorage revenues because of falling prices and falling nominal balances. Under
the balanced-budget regime these losses need to be oﬀset by the issuance of ad-
ditional debt, leading to potentially unstable debt dynamics. For this process to
be consistent with an equilibrium, the interest payments on debt, which are also
potentially unstable, would need to be reﬁnanced entirely out of distortionary tax
revenues. Such revenues, however, cannot grow without bounds for feasible equilib-
rium allocations. Yet, there exists a unique price level P0 (associated with uniquely
deﬁned tax sequences and equilibrium allocations) that devalues the initial nominal
liabilities in a manner consistent with the real determinacy of the equilibrium.13
2. Suppose that R =1 /β ⇔ π =1 , i.e. the steady state is characterized by price
11The discount factor β realistically takes values which are close to one, e.g. β =0 .99, implying 1/(1 −
β)=1 0 0 . Hence, the ‘restriction’ R ∈ (1,1/(1 − β)) can never be violated by reasonable values for the
gross nominal interest rate R.
12As summarized at the end of this section, multiple steady states characterized by diﬀerent debt levels
become possible under the complementary assumption 0 <σ<1.
13This sketch bears some resemblance to the explanation given by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2000, p.
221). However, the key diﬀerence is that in our economy with distortionary taxation revenues must be
bounded. This precludes the possibility of ever increasing debt and ensures, at the same time, the local
determinacy of equilibria.
14stability. Then the steady-state conﬁguration is described by
m − (1/β − 1)b =( g + m)1+ϑmσ(2 − β). (35)
Equation (35) implies that there exists a unique steady state if b ≤ 0. If b>0 there
exist exactly two steady states if b remains below some threshold b>0,i . e .a sl o n g
as b ∈ (0,b).14 The eigenvalues of the linearized dynamics at any steady state are
given by
λ1 =1 ,λ 2 = −
(σ − 1)





Hence, if π =1at any steady state equilibrium sequences are non-stationary because
of one unit root. Suppose that β>1/2. Then, λ1 =1 ,λ 2 ∈ (0,−1), implying that
at any steady state the equilibrium exhibits locally real indeterminacy, irrespective
of whether the steady state is unique or comes in pairs.
The intuition for these ﬁndings is as follows. Price stability (π =1 ) introduces a
unit root into the process of total government liabilities (bt + mt) and steady states
with m 6= −b become possible. In particular, if b>0 there is scope for a Laﬀer-
type constellation in which for given levels of b and g total steady-state expenditures
(1/β − 1)b + g>0 can be ﬁnanced either with a low tax rate (τd)a n dah i g ht a x
base (m + g) or, alternatively, with a high tax rate and a low tax base. However,
tax revenues cannot be arbitrarily high, placing an upper bound on the debt level
(b) to be rolled over in steady state.
In sum, the existence of steady states is related to the level of public debt and real
determinacy crucially depends on the level of the nominal interest rate. The analysis of
regime ii) thus reveals that genuine interactions of monetary and ﬁscal policy matter
for the determination of the equilibrium allocation when both ﬁscal policy (due to tax
distortions) and monetary policy (due to the liquidity constraint) are non-neutral.
Exogenous primary surplus For regime iii) the set of equilibrium sequences {mt,
πt+1,τ d
t,b t}∞
t=0 and the price level P0 are characterized by conditions (23)-(25), (27), and







which deﬁnes a unique sequence {mt}∞
t=0.15 According to Corollary 1 this sequence is
associated with unique sequences {πt+1,τ d
t}∞
t=0. According to (28) and as established in
14The RHS of (35) is continuously increasing in m, with RHS (m =0 )=0 , limm→∞RHS(m) →∞ , and
has a convex shape. The LHS is linearly rising in m. If b>0, there exists a unique b, giving rise to a
unique point of tangency between the LHS and RHS which satisﬁes m>0. T h eL H Sa n dt h eR H Sh a v e
two intersections m>0 if b ∈ (0,b) and there are zero intersections if b>b. Finally, if b ≤ 0 there exists a
unique intersection which satisﬁes m>0.
15The LHS of this equation is continuous and increasing in mt, with LHS (mt =0 )=g
1+ϑ
t > 0 and
limmt→∞LHS(mt) →∞ . The RHS is continuous and decreasing in mt, with limmt→0LHS(mt) →∞and
limmt→∞LHS(mt)=0 , implying the existence of a unique equilibrium sequence {mt > 0}
∞
t=0.
15Proposition 2, there exists a unique value P0 > 0, and equation (25) can be used to
determine a unique sequence {bt}∞
t=0. Thus, the equilibrium displays real determinacy.
Finally, consider gt = g>0 ∀t ≥ 0 and Rt = R>1 ∀t ≥ 0. The previous reasoning implies
that there exists a unique steady-state value m>0, associated with unique values π>0,
τd and b.I nt =0 , for arbitrary initial conditions the economy immediately settles down
at the steady-state value m>0. Similarly, the unique steady-state values of c and l are
immediately reached without adjustment dynamics.
The main results of this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that all taxes are distortionary such that Tt/Pt = τd
twtlt.
1. Under a ﬁscal policy regime satisfying i) the equilibrium displays real indeterminacy
and there exists a continuum of steady-state allocations.
2. Consider a ﬁscal policy regime satisfying ii) and assume gt = g>0 ∀t ≥ 0 and
Rt = R>1 ∀t ≥ 0.
(a) If R 6=1 /β ⇔ π 6=1 , there exists a unique steady state, satisfying m = −b.
Assume β>1/2 and R ∈ (1,1/(1 − β)). If R ∈ (1,1/β) the steady state
displays deﬂation (π<1) and the equilibrium exhibits locally real determinacy.
If R ∈ (1/β,1/(1 − β)) the steady state displays inﬂation (π>1),a n dt h e
equilibrium exhibits locally real indeterminacy.
(b) If R =1 /β ⇔ π =1 , there exists a unique steady state if b ≤ 0 and two
steady states if b ∈ (0,b). At any such steady state equilibrium sequences are
non-stationary because of one unit root. Assume β>1/2. Then, at any steady
state the equilibrium exhibits locally real indeterminacy.
3. Under a ﬁscal policy regime satisfying iii) the equilibrium exhibits real determinacy
and there exists a unique steady-state allocation.
Finally, we point out that the assumption of σ>1 (i.e. of risk aversion and a low
intertemporal elasticity of substitution) is important for some of our results. In particular,
the assessment of exogenous primary surpluses under regime iii) requires an important
modiﬁcation. This can be most easily seen by making the complementary assumption 0 <
σ<1. Concerning regime i), the analysis remains qualitatively unchanged. Concerning
regime ii), steady states come in pairs if R 6=1 /β as one infers from m1−σ(1 + R−1
Rβ )=
(g + m)1+ϑ 2R−1
R . Intuitively, a high elasticity of substitution generates the possibility of
multiple steady states characterized by diﬀerent debt levels (i.e. diﬀerent levels of net
lending towards the private sector), diﬀerent activity levels and diﬀerent levels of the
(endogenously determined) distortionary tax rate. Local dynamics around these steady
states are well identiﬁed and the local (in)determinacy of equilibria cannot be assessed
without reference to the magnitude of R.16 Concerning regime iii), it is no longer true
that the real determinacy of the equilibrium under regime iii) remains preserved during
16The expressions of the eigenvalues derived above are valid for σ>0.
16the switch from lump-sum to distortionary taxation. This can be seen from equation
(36) in which a high elasticity of substitution generically gives rise to two positive valued
sequences {mt}∞
t=0, provided gt > 0 and Rt > 1 are not too high. Similarly, assume
gt = g>0 and Rt = R>1. Then, for suitable values of g and R steady states with m>0
come in pairs. In t =0 , for arbitrary initial conditions either of the two steady states can
be immediately reached without any adjustment dynamics.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper reconsiders the nominal and real determinacy of equilibria under an exoge-
nously speciﬁed path of interest rates in an economy in which taxation is either lump-sum
or distortionary and in which government liabilities are issued in nominal terms. Under
lump-sum taxation, we conﬁrm the well-known ﬁnding that equilibria display nominal
(in)determinacy if the primary surplus is exogenous (endogenous). Under distortionary
taxation this classiﬁcation breaks down. Intuitively, distortionary taxes establish a link
between equilibrium allocations and the paths of taxes and debt and, hence, the price
level. This link is independent of whether the sequence of primary surpluses is exogenous
or endogenous, implying that nominal determinacy of equilibria can always be ensured
under distortionary taxation.
The paper also shows that, compared with lump-sum taxation, the non-neutrality of dis-
tortionary taxation increases the scope for the real indeterminacy of equilibria. With both
ﬁscal and monetary policy being non-neutral, the determination of a unique equilibrium
allocation requires a full characterization of government ﬁnancing in terms of debt and
taxes and it relies as well on the speciﬁcation of monetary policy.
In sum, if ﬁscal policy is realistically assumed to be non-neutral due to distortionary
taxation the nominal indeterminacy of equilibria is no longer an issue and genuine inter-
actions of monetary and ﬁscal policy become relevant for the determination of equilibrium
allocations.
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18Appendix A: The household problem



















t bt−1 + π−1
t mt−1 − ct − bt − mt − τt
io
.
For interior solutions, the ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
∂£/∂ct =0⇔ c−σ








∂£/∂bt =0⇔ β (1 + it)λt+1π−1
t+1 − λt =0 ,
∂£/∂mt =0⇔ βλt+1π−1
t+1 − λt + µt =0 ,
and the transversality condition limt→∞ (bt + mt)
Qt
i=1 πi/Ri−1 =0 . Combining the ﬁrst-
order conditions yields βλt+1π−1
t+1 =( 1+it)−1λt and (1 + it)−1λt − λt + µt =0 , and thus
c−σ
t = 2Rt−1
Rt λt,w h e r eRt =1+it. Eliminating λt and µt, leads to (4)-(6).
Appendix B: Dynamics under a balanced budget and distortionary taxation
Consider (31)-(32). For the steady-state analysis, assume gt = g>0,R t = R>1 ∀t ≥ 0,
implying that the equilibrium sequences {at,m t}∞











(R − 1), (38)
with Φ(mt)=m1−σ
t − (mt + g)
1+ϑ 2R−1
R . (37) and (38) are characterized by one forward-
looking variable (mt) and one backward-looking variable (at−1). The steady-state condi-
tions are given by Φ(m)a = m1−σ R−1
Rβ and i.) R 6=1 /β s.t. a = −1 or ii.) R =1 /β.
Log-linearizing (31)-(32) and using Φa = m1−σ R−1
Rβ leads to







(σ − 1+φ) b mt,














φ(1 − σ + a+1
Rβ (σ − 1+φ)) a
φRβ
−a+1







The associated characteristic equation is given by
λ2 +( a − σ − φ − Rβ − aσ + Rσβ +1 )( Rβφ)−1λ + a(σ − 1)(Rβφ)−1 =0 (39)
191. Consider ﬁrst steady states with R 6=1 /β and a = −1. Then (39) simpliﬁes to
λ2 −
φ+Rβ(1−σ)
Rβφ λ + 1−σ
Rβφ =0 , implying the root structure λ1 = 1












φ =0 ,w i t hr o o t sλ1 =1and λ2 =
(σ−1)a
φ = −
(σ−1)
(1+ϑ)(g+m)ϑmσ(2−β)+(σ−1)( 1
β −1).
20